Abstract-In this paper we introduce Password Authenticated Keyword Search (PAKS), a cryptographic scheme where any user can use a single human-memorizable password to outsource encrypted data with associated keywords to a group of servers and later retrieve this data through the encrypted keyword search procedure. PAKS ensures that only the legitimate user who knows the initially registered password can perform outsourcing and retrieval of the encrypted data. In particular, PAKS guarantees that no single server can mount an offline attack on the user's password or learn any information about the encrypted keywords. The concept behind PAKS protocols extends previous concepts behind searchable encryption by removing the requirement on the client to store high-entropy keys, thus making the protocol device-agnostic on the user side. In this paper we model three security requirements for PAKS schemes (indistinguishability against chosen keyword attacks, authentication and consistency) and propose an efficient direct construction in a two-server setting those security we prove in the standard model under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our efficiency comparison shows that the proposed scheme is practical and offers high performance in relation to computations and communications on the user side.
I. INTRODUCTION
Searchable encryption. Using protocols for Searchable Encryption [1] - [4] clients with limited computing and storage resources can outsource encrypted data to a server or a collection of servers, perform search over the encrypted data (typically using encrypted keywords) and eventually retrieve searched data while preserving its privacy against the servers. Existing searchable encryption schemes can be broadly split into those where the keyword search procedure requires either high-entropy shared keys such as Symmetric Searchable Encryption (SSE) schemes from [3] , [5] , [6] or a private-public key pair such as Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) schemes from [1] , [2] , [6] - [10] on the user side.
In practice, the requirement to maintain high-entropy keys on the user side results in less flexibility when it comes to the use of multiple, different devices for outsourcing and retrieval of data. The user is effectively prevented from using different devices unless the private key is made available to every such device.
Password Authenticated Keyword Search (PAKS). The idea of basing searchable encryption solely on passwords, proposed in this paper, helps to avoid costly and risky key management on the user side and enables the whole process to be device-agnostic. This, however, comes with challenges considering that both passwords and keywords typically have low entropy. Amongst the core security properties of PAKS there is a need to guarantee that only the legitimate user, who knows the password, can outsource, search and retrieve data. Hence, basing security of searchable encryption schemes on passwords introduces the need for a distributed server environment where trust is spread across at least two noncolluding servers, as is also the case in many password-based protocols for authentication and secret sharing, e.g. [11] - [19] . While a more general secret sharing architecture with t-outof-n servers would be applicable as well, the use of two servers can be seen as the most practical scenario and the minimum requirement to achieve protection against offline dictionary attacks. The use of two servers is required not only to protect passwords but also to prevent keyword guessing attacks, like those demonstrated in [10] for (public key-based) PEKS schemes.
We model PAKS as a cryptographic scheme where users can register their passwords with the servers and then re-use these passwords for multiple sessions of the outsource and retrieval protocols. In each outsource session the user can outsource encrypted keywords along with some (encrypted) document to both servers. The retrieval protocol realises the search procedure based on the keyword that the user inputs to the protocol and provides the user with all documents associated with that keyword allowing the user to also verify the integrity of the retrieved documents. We define security of the PAKS scheme using BPR-like models [20] , [21] that have been widely used for password-based protocols. We define privacy of PAKS keywords through indistinguishability against chosen keyword attacks (IND-CKA) while considering active adversaries, possibly in control of at most one server, who can also register own passwords in the system. While IND-CKA security protects against the adversary who does not know the password from successfully retrieving outsourced data, we additionally require authentication to protect the outsourcing operation itself, thus preventing the adversary from outsourcing data on behalf of the user; this requirement must also hold even if the adversary controls one of the servers. Our third PAKS requirement, consistency, akin to [1] , ensures the correctness of the retrieval process, in particular prevents cases where one keyword is used to outsource data that can then be retrieved using a different keyword.
Our direct PAKS construction follows conceptually the following more general approach that combines ideas behind Password Authenticated Secret Sharing (PASS) [11] - [17] and SSE [3] , [5] , [6] . In the registration phase, the user picks a password π and a high-entropy symmetric key K that will be used to encrypt keywords and secret-shares K protected with π across both servers. In order to outsource keywords the user engages into the PASS reconstruction protocol to obtain K and then into the SSE outsource protocol to outsource the keywords. In order to search for keywords and retrieve data the user again reconstructs K using PASS and performs the keyword search using SSE. We stress however that our construction is direct and does not use PASS and SSE as generic building blocks. A generic construction from these two primitives remains currently out of reach due to significant differences in the syntax, functionality and security amongst the existing PASS protocols. First, PASS protocols do not separate registration from secret sharing phase and therefore do not enforce user authentication upon secret sharing which would be required for the outsourcing protocol in PAKS.
Existing PASS protocols were proven in different security models, e.g. BPR-like in [11] , [15] and UC-based in [12] , [16] , [17] , and do not necessarily follow the same functionality and syntax, which makes it hard to use PASS as a generic building block in PAKS without revising the syntax and security models of those PASS protocols. While we could update the syntax of PASS protocols to allow for a generic usage in PAKS such update would introduce changes to the original PASS protocols and require new security proofs. Moreover, generic constructions often lead to less efficient instantiations than directly constructed schemes. For all the aforementioned reasons we are not formally proposing a generic PAKS construction in this paper and opt for a direct and efficient scheme (cf. Section IV) based on well-known assumptions in the standard model. Paper organization. We introduce preliminaries and building blocks in Section II. The syntax and security of the PAKS scheme are formalized in Section III. Our direct PAKS construction (along with efficiency considerations and comparison with prior work) is proposed in Section IV and its security is analysed in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND BUILDING BLOCKS
Pedersen commitments [22] . Let g, h be two generators in a multiplicative cyclic group G with order q, and the discrete logarithm between h and g is unknown. For a message m ∈ Z * q , the Pedersen commitment is computed as c ← g r h m where r $ ← Z * q and is opened by providing (r, m). We recall that Pedersen commitments offer computational binding based the discrete logarithm problem, i.e. assuming Adv DL A (κ) is negligible, and provide perfect hiding.
Pseudorandom function (PRF) [23] , [24] . Let k ∈ K PRF be a high min-entropy key in the PRF key space. A pseudorandom function PRF is called (t, q, (κ))-secure if for any PPT algorithm A running in time t with at most q oracle queries the probability Adv PRF A (κ) ≤ (κ) for distinguishing the outputs of PRF(k, m) from the outputs of a truly random function f of the same length, assuming that A has oracle access to O PRF (·) which contains either PRF(k, ·) or f (·) and which cannot be queried on m.
Key derivation function (KDF) [25] . Let Σ be a source of key material. A key derivation function KDF is called (t, q, (κ))-secure with respect to Σ if for any PPT algorithm A running in time t with at most q oracle queries the probability Adv KDF A (κ) ≤ (κ) for distinguishing the output of KDF(k, c) from uniformly drawn random strings of the same length, assuming that (k, α) ← Σ where k is the secret key material and α is some side information. It is assumed that A knows α, has control over the context information c and has oracle access to KDF(k, ·) which cannot be queried on c.
Message authentication code [26] . A message authentication code (KGen, Tag, Vrfy) is comprised of the algorithms
• KGen(κ): on input security parameter κ output key mk ← {0, 1} κ .
• Tag(mk, m): on input a key mk and a message m, output tag μ ← Tag(mk, m).
• Vrfy(mk, m, μ): on input a key mk, a message m and a tag μ outputs 1 if μ is valid or 0 otherwise. A MAC is secure if any PPT algorithm A without knowledge of mk has only negligible probability Adv MAC A (κ) to forge a tag μ * for some message m * . A has access to the tag oracle O Tag (·) which returns μ ← Tag(mk, m) on input m. The only restriction is that m * is never queried to O Tag (·).
III. PASSWORD AUTHENTICATED KEYWORD SEARCH: SYNTAX AND DEFINITIONS
In this section we provide definitions for the functionality of PAKS and its security properties.
A. Syntax of PAKS
After initialization, the functionality of PAKS is defined by three protocols. These protocols are themselves defined as interactive algorithms executed by the protocol participants.
Functionality of PAKS. Our PAKS functionality allows any user U to perform initial registration procedure with any two servers S 0 and S 1 in the system and then use the registered password π (from some dictionary D) to outsource and retrieve data based on associated keywords w ∈ W. Each server S d , d ∈ {0, 1} maintains its own database where for each user it records the associated secret information info d obtained during the registration procedure and the outsourced data (C, ix) obtained from multiple executions of the outsource protocol; C represents ciphertexts for the keywords whereas ix stands for the outsourced (and typically encrypted) document that is associated with the encrypted keywords. Similar to other searchable encryption schemes (e.g. [1]) we do not explicitly model the encryption of outsourced documents and use indices ix ∈ I I I as placeholders instead.
• Setup(1 κ ) is an initialisation algorithm that on input a security parameter κ ∈ N generates public parameters par of the scheme.
• Register is a registration protocol executed between some user U (running interactive algorithm RegisterU) and two servers S 0 and S 1 (running interactive algorithms 
• Retrieve is a retrieval protocol executed between some user U (running interactive algorithm RetrieveU) and two servers S 0 and S 1 (running interactive algorithms 
OutsourceS 0 (par, U, info 0 ), OutsourceS 1 (par, U, info 1 ) ;
In other words, the user should always be able to retrieve all indices ix that were previously outsourced under some keyword w as long as this user is registered and has used its registered password π in those outsourcing and in the retrieval protocol sessions. 
B. Security definitions of PAKS
We define security of PAKS using three main requirements: indistinguishability against chosen keyword attacks (IND-CKA), authentication and consistency. We adopt a BPR-like modeling approach [21] for password-based cryptographic protocols and define security through experiments (cf. Figure 1) where a PPT adversary A has full control over the communication channels and can interact with parties (controlled by a simulator) through the set of oracles defined in the following.
Adversary model and oracles. For each user U we allow A to take full control over at most one of the two servers S 0 and S 1 that were chosen by U during the registration phase to capture the required distributed trust relationship. We mostly use S d to denote the uncorrupted server and S 1-d to denote the server controlled by the adversary. The oracles allow A to invoke interactive algorithms for all protocols of PAKS which will be executed (honestly) by the simulator. A can interact with these algorithms and by this participate in the protocol. In particular, we allow A to participate in outsourcing and retrieval protocols on behalf of some corrupted server and also as some (illegitimate) user who tries to guess the registered password during the execution of the protocol.
Let τ τ τ be an initially empty array that will be populated with tuples of the form τ τ τ [j] ← (d, π, info d ) at the end of each successful j-th registration session such that π is the registered password and info d is the secret data stored at the server S d at the end of that session. We also use variables i * ∈ Z, ix * ∈ I and a set Set that are maintained by the experiments. The adversary A can access the following oracles.
• Challenge oracle
. Note that this oracle will be used to model IND-CKA security of PAKS.
. Note that this oracle will be used to model consistency of PAKS.
• Registration oracle Reg(·): on input d ∈ {0, 1}, the experiment first initializes C C C d,j ← ∅ as a database for session j. Then, it randomly picks fresh (π 
. The Outsource protocol is then executed with A where the oracle plays the roles of honest U and S d executing algorithms OutsourceU(par, π, w, ix, S 0 , S 1 ) and
, respectively, and A plays the role of malicious S 1-d . In both Auth and Con experiments, the oracle additionally computes
The Outsource protocol is then executed with A where the oracle plays the role of honest S d executing algorithm OutsourceS d (par, U, info d ) and A plays the roles of (illegitimate) U and corrupted S 1-d . Note that this oracle will be used to model authentication of PAKS.
• Retrieve oracle Ret(·, ·): on input (i, w), the oracle aborts if i ≥ j. In the IND-CKA experiment, the oracle also aborts if
The Retrieve protocol is then executed with A where the oracle plays the roles of honest U and S d executing algorithms RetrieveU(par, π, w, S 0 , S 1 ) and RetrieveS d (par, U, info d ), respectively, and A plays the role of corrupted
The Retrieve protocol is then executed with A where the oracle plays the role of honest S d executing algorithm RetrieveS d (par, U, info d ) and A plays the roles of (illegitimate) U and corrupted S 1-d . Note that this oracle will be used to models IND-CKA and Con-security of PAKS. Figure 1 ) and is closely related to [5] except that our setting is based on passwords. A is given the public parameters par and permitted to adaptively access oracles
Indistinguishability against Chosen Keyword Attacks (IND-CKA). The IND-CKA property for PAKS is defined through the experiment Exp
and RetS(·) at most 1, q r , q o , q t and q s times, respectively. In particular, our IND-CKA experiment captures the following ways that A may try to retrieve data: (i) from interaction with an honest user U and the honest server S d playing the role of corrupted S 1-d (which is captured through the oracle Ret(·, ·)), or (ii) from interaction with the honest server S d playing the role of illegitimate user, e.g. trying to guess the registered password, and the corrupted server S 1-d (which is captured through the oracle RetS(·)).
Let Adv
denote the advantage of A in the IND-CKA security experiment. A PAKS scheme is called IND-CKA-secure if the probability Adv
where |D| is the dictionary size and (κ) is negligible in the security parameter κ. Note that probability qs |D| relates to the use of oracle RetS(·) that models on-line dictionary attacks and assumes uniform distribution of passwords within D, as is also common in BPR-like models.
Authentication (Auth). The property of authentication for PAKS is defined using experiment Exp Auth PAKS,A (κ) in Figure 1 . A is given the public parameters par and permitted to access oracles Reg(·), Out(·, ·, ·), OutS(·) and Ret(·, ·) with at most q r , q o , q s and q t times, respectively. Our experiment effectively captures attacks where A tries to outsource some data ix * on behalf of some user U without knowing the registered password (via OutS(·) oracle), possibly after having interacted with U and the honest server S d . In its attack on authentication A can play the role of a corrupted server S 1-d and also mount man-inthe-middle attacks on sessions of Outsource and Retrieve protocols involving user U.
A PAKS scheme provides authentication if for all PPT A the probability Adv Consistency (Con). We define consistency of PAKS using experiment Exp Con PAKS,A (κ) in Figure 1 , adapting this notion from [1] to the PAKS setting. The property aims to rule out false positives when performing the keyword search. A is given the public parameters par and permitted to access oracles Ch con (·, ·, ·), Reg(·), Out(·, ·, ·), Ret(·, ·) and RetS(·) with at most 1, q r , q o , q t and q s times, respectively. In particular, A should not be able to come up with different keywords w 0 and w 1 from which w 0 will be used by an honest user to outsource some data ix * (via Ch con (·, ·, ·) oracle) and w 1 used to retrieve this data later. A PAKS scheme is called consistent if the probability Adv 
IV. OUR DIRECT PAKS CONSTRUCTION
In this section we propose a direct and efficient construction of PAKS. It follows our general idea of combining suitable password-authenticated secret sharing with symmetric searchable encryption techniques. In the introduction we explained the difficulties behind an attempt to construct PAKS generically using PASS and SSE schemes and motivated our choice for a direct construction.
High-level idea. Our PAKS protocol is inspired by the techniques used in the recent password-authenticated secret sharing protocol from [15] which we modified to address the functionality and requirements of PAKS and extended with a suitable mechanism for symmetric searchable encryption of keywords. In particular, we define a new registration protocol Register upon which the user registers its password π encrypted in C π with both servers and also picks a symmetric key K for which it computes appropriate shares K 0 and K 1 which are then sent to the corresponding servers. The reconstruction of K is protected by π and MAC codes μ d are used to ensure the validity of K upon its reconstruction. The protocols Outsource and Retrieve proceed according to the similar pattern. First, the user reconstructs K using its password π after communication with both servers. Then, in Outsource protocol U uses K in combination with its keyword w to derive a trapdoor t ← KDF 2 (K, w) and a fresh randomness e to derive verifier v ← PRF(t, e). The pair (e, v) becomes part of the outsourced ciphertext C which is bound to some data ix. During the Retrieve protocol the user can recompute the trapdoor t for a given keyword w and then send it to the servers who can the find all outsourced ciphertexts C for which v ← PRF(t, e) holds and hence identify which data ix needs to be returned. In order to prevent servers from creating their own pairs (e, v) for a given t the outsourced ciphertext C additionally includes a MAC tag μ c which authenticates (e, v) and also ix and which can only be computed and verified using K. During the Retrieve protocol the user will ensure that it final search result contains only data that passes this integrity and authenticity check. In addition both protocols make use of MACs to ensure authenticity of messages, where the MAC keys are derived from K on the user side. We emphasis that our PAKS construction is in the password-only setting where servers are not required to possess any public keys for the security of the PAKS scheme. However, if the registration protocol Register is performed remotely over a public network then this protocol needs to be executed over server-authenticated secure-channels (e.g. TLS). In order to enable reconstruction of K by the user and to protect this phase with the password both servers communicate with each other as part of the Outsource and Retrieve protocols. While in practice this communication between the two servers will likely be protected using a secure channel (e.g. TLS) we public inputs: stress that in our protocols this communication can take place over an insecure channel.
Detailed description. In the following we provide a detailed description of all algorithms and protocols underlying our direct PAKS scheme, along with Figures 2 and 3 • Protocol Register: User U picks r 1 , r 2 
, 1} over server-authenticated secure channels. Finally, U memorizes π.
• Protocol Outsource: For d ∈ {0, 1}, the Outsource protocol between U and S d is illustrated in Figure 2 and detailed in the following. Note that as part of the Outsource protocol both S 0 and S 1 communicate with each other, possibly over an insecure channel. 
to server S 1-d and wait for its response c 1-d . 
3) Upon receiving (Y, Z 0 , μ 0 ) and (Y, Z 1 , μ 1 ) from both servers, user U executes following steps:
where
• Protocol Retrieve: For d ∈ {0, 1}, the Retrieve protocol between U and S d is illustrated in Figure 3 and detailed in the following. Note that as part of the Outsource protocol both S 0 and S 1 communicate with each other, possibly over an insecure channel. 
to server S 1-d and wait for its response
3) Upon receiving (Y, Z 0 , μ 0 ) and (Y, Z 1 , μ 1 ) from both servers, U executes following steps: , μ c ) = 1. This step guarantees that only outsourced data for which the integrity check was performed successfully will be added to the output set I I I. The correctness of the protocol can be easily verified once we illustrate here that if the correct password π is used by the user in the Outsource and Retrieve protocols then the reconstruction through Z 0 Z 1 Y a results in a correct key K:
A. Efficiency comparison
Given that our direct PAKS construction follows the general idea of building PAKS protocols based on the techniques used for password-authenticated secret sharing, we compare performance with existing PASS protocols. Since our PAKS scheme assumes password-only setting (except for the registration) we restrict our comparison to password-only PASS schemes [11] , [14] , [15] , [17] and compare only the costs that arise from the sharing and retrieval of the symmetric key K -note that in our PAKS scheme sharing of K is performed as part of the Register protocol whereas retrieval of K is part of both Outsource and Retrieve protocols and is accomplished in step 3 of these protocols. Since our PAKS scheme adopts a two-server architecture but the aforementioned PASS schemes were designed for a more general t-out-of-n threshold setting we consider their costs for the special case of t = n = 2 to ease the comparison. The results of the comparison are presented in Table I . We compare computation costs through the number of modular exponentiations for the user and each of the servers during the sharing and retrieval phases of the symmetric key K. We also compare communication costs in the number of bits communicated in both phases, while considering user-server and server-server communications. For the lengths of elements in G and Z * q we use |G| = q and |q| = κ bits, respectively. We also compare the number of rounds needed for the sharing and retrieval of K.
We observe that in terms of computation and communication costs key sharing and reconstruction phases in our PAKS scheme compare fairly well with those of existing PASS protocols. In particular, only [17] which is the most computationally efficient PASS protocol today offers better overall computation and communication performance. We stress however that for PAKS protocols the efficiency of the retrieval phase is of greater importance than of the sharing phase. This is because in PAKS sharing of K is performed only once as part of the registration procedure, but retrieval of K occurs each time the user wants to outsource data or search for keywords. Furthermore, due to the simplified key management (i.e. reliance on passwords only) PAKS offers deviceagnostic use of the functionality to the user and can possibly be executed on different client devices (ranging from desktops over to smartphones). In this case it becomes important to keep the costs associated with computations on the user side and the user-server communication low. Considering this we observe that in comparison to [17] our PAKS scheme achieves similar and even partly better performance for computations and communication involving the user device.
As a result of our comparison we conclude that our PAKS scheme is sufficiently practical since the additional costs arising from the encrypted keyword search functionality within our PAKS protocols are negligible (due to the nature of computations involved) in comparison to the costly key sharing and retrieval steps.
B. Extensions with multiple keywords
In the given specification of our PAKS construction users can use only one keyword w in each execution of Outsource and Retrieve protocols at a time. Often, users may want to be able to outsource or search for documents associated with multiple keywords. Our PAKS scheme can be extended to provide efficient support for multiple keywords. Let w w w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) be a set of outsourced keywords for some document ix and let w w w = (w 1 , . . . , w m ) be a set of searched keywords. In the following we show how to support (i) outsourcing of ix with w w w through a single session of the Outsource protocol and (ii) search for all suitable documents ix using w w w through a single session of the Retrieve protocol, based on three different types of search queries [8] : conjunctive queries (w w w = w w w ), disjunctive queries (|w w w ∩ w w w | > 0), and those for a subset of keywords (w w w ⊆ w w w).
Outsourcing documents with multiple keywords. In order to outsource some document ix associated with multiple keywords w w w = (w 1 , . . . , w n (t i , e), i = 1, . . . , m, and  update the output set A A A d ← A A A d ∪ (C, ix) according to the following conditions, depending on the type of search search query, i.e.
• for conjunctive queries
C. Password change
Our PAKS scheme allows users to change their passwords without changing the encryption keys K, avoiding reencryption of outsourced keywords. A new password π * can be registered with the knowledge of the current π as follows: 1) User U sends A ← g a h π to both servers (as in Outsource and Retrieve). Each server
2) Upon reconstructing mk d as in Outsource and
Retrieve protocols and verifying μ d , the user picks
r * , C π * ), and sends (g
Note that current π is used to authenticate the user towards both servers. If the user no longer remembers π then changing the password while keeping the encryption key K would require additional authentication mechanisms based on which U would be able to retrieve info d from S d to reconstruct and re-share K with the new π * , as in the registration phase.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PAKS
In the following we prove the security of our direct PAKS scheme using our definitions from Section III-B. In the proofs we adopt the standard game-hopping technique. Let succ n denote the event that the adversary wins in the experiment n.
A. IND-CKA-security of our PAKS scheme
Theorem 1: Our direct PAKS construction is IND-CKAsecure assuming the hardness of the DDH problem and security of KDF 1 , KDF 2 , PRF and MAC. Proof. Experiment Exp 
A (κ) As a consequence, based on Lemmas 1 to 8 we can conclude that our proposed PAKS construction is IND-CKAsecure assuming the intractability of the DDH problem and security of KDF 1 , KDF 2 , PRF and MAC. 
B. Authentication property of our PAKS scheme
, increments j ← j + 1, and stores r 2 and x 1-d for later use in the proof.
• Out(·, ·, ·): on input (i, w, ix), the simulator aborts if
Then, it sets Set ← Set ∪ (i, w, ix). Finally, it plays the roles of U and S d , and interacts with A who plays the role of S 1-d party in the Outsource protocol.
• OutS(·): on input i, the simulator aborts if (i ≥ j); otherwise, it obtains parameters 
and ) is equal
; under the DDH assumption, the adversary cannot distinguish h (π−π )(y0+y1) (in Exp Auth 2 ) from a random number in G (in Exp . A deterministic function •
• Reg(·): on input d ∈ {0, 1} the simulator randomly selects fresh π 
, increments j ← j + 1, and stores variables r 2 and x 1-d for later use in the proof.
. Then, it sets Set ← Set ∪ (i, w, ix). The simulator and A then execute the Outsource protocol, where the simulator plays the roles of U and S d , and interacts with A that plays the role of 
and
If Q = g αβ , this experiment is identical to Exp Con 2 ; otherwise, identical to Exp 
VI. CONCLUSION
We introduced Password Authenticated Keyword Search (PAKS) as a new concept where search over encrypted keywords can be performed solely with the help of a humanmemorizable password. In comparison to earlier formats of searchable encryption the use of passwords simplifies key management and by removing the need for storing and managing high-entropy keys on the user side makes the whole process device-agnostic. The use of passwords introduces however new challenges to the design of PAKS protocols; in particular, creating the need for a distributed server architecture to achieve security against offline dictionary attacks.
In this paper we modeled the functionality and security properties of PAKS, incl. IND-CKA-security for keyword privacy, authentication for outsourcing, and consistency for the search procedure, and proposed a direct PAKS construction those security and privacy has been proven under standard assumptions. Our direct PAKS construction is an optimised version of a more general concept for building PAKS protocols based on techniques underlying password-authenticated secret sharing and symmetric searchable encryption. The proposed PAKS scheme is practical and offers high performance in relation to computations and communications on the user side.
